Canada’s Role In The Arctic

The purpose of this essay is to develop a greater understanding of Canada’s modern interests in the Arctic, Canada’s claims to Arctic sovereignty, and to argue for the greater need of Canada to lead development in the Arctic. The Canadian Arctic’s value can be measured in quantitative terms such as economic potential and strategic security, but also in terms of intrinsic self-identity. This paper will demonstrate that Canada does have a claim to the Arctic as a sovereign state and will argue for Canada to implement a more leading role in the region. This paper will begin by briefly discussing the history of the Canadian Arctic and how past events have influenced contemporary understandings and geo-political arrangements. Second this paper will look at the value of the Canadian Arctic, what states want from the Arctic, and the effect of climate change. The third section will analyze multiple leading theorists to understand how Canada’s claims to sovereignty are contested, where potential threats or opportunities arise, and ultimately how Canada must situate itself in the ever-changing global Arctic relations. Lastly this paper will examine possible solutions and actions that Canada needs to take. The goal of this paper is to argue that Canada does have sovereign claims to its land and, without raising alarmist or sensationalist rhetoric, does need to protect its interests and take a leading role in the Arctic to stimulate development, pursue economic interests, ensure environmental and social protection, maintain military defense, and fundamentally control both its own lands and waters, but furthermore help lead collaboration and standardization to create a safer and more prosperous world region.

The Canadian Arctic has had a long history which fundamentally changed during the post World War 2 and Cold War era. During this time period, Canadians began to see their northern sovereignty as more than simply “colours on a map.”1 Due to the conflict between the US and Russia, and Canada’s geographic placement between the two states, the Arctic evolved into a region with increased military operations including joint US-Canadian initiatives.2 The region became militarized which meant larger surveillance apparatuses, the creation of multiple military bases, the creation of the L.O.R.A.N. Stations, the training of new military personnel, and the introduction of equipment and ships which could traverse and successfully defend Canada and US from a perceived Northern invasion or bombing.3 Ideas that Canada was now a three-ocean frontier became popularized4, and theorists stressed the importance of mentally envisioning Canada with this Northern frontier which needed to be protected and controlled.5 In theory, Canada had sovereign claim over this region of the world, but during the Cold War and especially into the 1970s the Canadian government increasingly amped up its support of and interest in the Arctic to enforce these claims and to bolster military security. In the 1970s Canada pushed defensive policy and released reports which outlined concerns and regulations for the future of the Arctic. The 1971 White Paper on Defence was especially clear when it stated that “sovereignty challenges could arise from ‘territorial violations or infringements of Canadian laws.’”6

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The 1970s also had a key geopolitical tension develop between Canada and the US over the Northwest Passage.7 Contestation existed and still exists on whether to consider the Northwest Passage as Canada claims it to be, internal historic waters, or as the US views it, as an international strait.7 The fundamental difference determines control over the waterway; if Canada successfully convinces the world community that the Northwest Passage is internal and Canadian, then that ultimately gives Canada regulatory control and power over the ships and submarines passing through. If the water routes stay defined as an international strait, then it means Canada has little or no influence or power in regulating or monitoring international ships in these waters. The benefit to Canada of this control is significant and will be discussed further in this research paper. This contestation was again reinforced by Canada in the early 1980s within a House of Commons statement concerning the Arctic where they protested that, “We must come up to speed in a range of marine operations that bear on our capacity to exercise control over the Northwest Passage and our other Arctic waters.”9 These territorial boundary lines are crucially important because the Canadian argument is that anything within them is internal waters, not international. Canada was clearly standing firm that the Northwest Passage and other Canadian routes are internal and subject to Canadian control.

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The 1970s also featured early legislation and policy which attempted to control not only the traditional security concerns, such as defence, but also social and environmental concerns.10 An early example of this type of legislation is Bill C-202 from 1970 which outlined regulations to prevent pollution in the Arctic and ultimately declare accountability and responsibility to companies and countries who actively disregarded the environment.11 As the 1980s came to a close and the Cold War diminished the Arctic relationships began to change. Largely ignored and dismissed by the West, in 1987 Gorbachev in Murmansk called for a “zone of peace” in the Arctic.12 However, slowly with the ending of the Cold War, nuclear disarmament, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, the Arctic began to revert back from a modern military hotbed, to an area for possible exploration, development, and collaboration. Ideas for an international Arctic Council were actually initiated by Canada with Brian Mulroney in 1989, then finally formally created in 1996.13 However with the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991 and the end of the Cold War, Canadian interest in the Arctic diminished and the “rationalization for expensive platforms” disappeared.14 It would not be until the mid-to-late 2000s that Canada once again became deeply interested in the Arctic; this is largely due to climate change.

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Due to climate change, the Arctic is fundamentally transforming leading to a shift in policies and interests by multiple actors. According to the National Snow and Ice Data Center, along with most credible institutions, the Arctic ice is melting at unprecedented levels and is permanently reducing in size.15 In 2007 they revealed that the “Arctic sea ice receded so much that the fabled Northwest Passage completely opened for the first time in human memory.”16 This melting of ice and opening of waterways has led to many countries seeking new travel routes and new opportunities for development and resource exploitation. The Arctic Athabaskan Council stated that “the rapid decline in recent years of multi-year sea ice in the Arctic Ocean has attracted considerable attention worldwide.”17 All of the sources I found for this paper, while disagreeing on many issues, all agreed that the Arctic is changing fundamentally and that Canada needs to address this change. The Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans in 2009 stressed for action addressing the coming increase in international shipping due to the loss of ice.18 Rob Huebert has been especially vocal about urging Canada’s government to act. Huebert argues that this unprecedented transformation needs urgent attention due to the many countries including the US, Russia, Iceland, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway, “who all seek to bolster their various Arctic claims.”19 Huebert explains that within the Arctic there are many resources and goals that multiple states want and now this is more possible and profitable than ever due to the changing environment and opening of waterways. Resource extraction, oil and natural gas exploitation, scientific and commercial development, control over passage ways, seabed exploration, and military strategy are just some of the many pursuits of actors.20 Potentially 50% of the worlds hydrocarbons are predicted to lie in the Arctic.21 As well as resources such as over one third of the world’s diamonds can be found in the Arctic.22 Dittman argues that the Arctic “includes a vast repository of resources, the bulk of which remain undeveloped.”23 It’s clear that countries, such as Russia, are deeply interested in increasing influence and control in the Arctic for their own interests and profits.24 This raises important questions: Does Canada have a sovereign claim? Is this claim threatened by any other countries? Why should Canada care about the Arctic?

This paper argues that Canada does not have a serious threat to its sovereignty, however, it must absolutely remain in control of the North, enforce its sovereign claim, and become a leader for regulation and standardization. There is an ongoing debate in the academic literature over if Canada’s sovereignty is seriously at risk; Rob Huebert is the most vocal from this perspective. Dittman also agrees with Huebert and states that “Canada faces security and sovereignty issues that are both remnants of the Cold War era and newly emerging.”25 Huebert argues that Canada might lose its claims to sovereignty if it can not defend against threats in the North.26 He argues that, in certain areas such as the Yukon, Northwest Territories, and southern Nunavut, Canada has clear sovereignty; however he sees threats to Canada’s land and sea borders further north.27 According to Huebert, three things decide whether Canada has sovereignty in the north. First, Canada must have a clearly defined territory, second, there must be a system of governance and enforcement in place, and third there must be people actually living in the defined territory.28 Huebert sees Arctic Canada as a zone with borders that are seriously threatened and gives three main recommendations for what needs to be done. First he argues for a stronger decision making process including a Cabinet committee dedicated to Arctic Affairs, he also argues for an increase in surveillance and military capabilities, and third he argues Canada should have a more leading role in global Arctic councils.29 I agree with much of Huebert’s ideas, where I find he is mistaken is in stressing the threat to Canadian sovereignty and focusing so heavily on defence and military altercations. Huebert claims that international challenges threaten Canada’s sovereignty and claim to its Arctic space, he references disputes with the US and Denmark and argues that these land and boundary disputes profoundly threaten Canada.30 This fear and rhetoric I argue is alarmist and sensationalist.

The Canadian government in multiple reports, as well as theorists such as Michael Byers, Whitney Lackenbauer, and Wilfred Grieves, would also disagree with Huebert. Lackenbauer stresses that alarmist language over small disputes such as the Hans Island issue with Denmark become a “case of how a modest, manageable dispute can become a cause célèbre.”31 He continues, “Denmark and Canada quietly disagreed over ownership of the tiny, uninhabited island for more than three decades before political theatre and hyperbolic rhetoric created a “crisis” that some commentators portrayed as the opening salvo in a coming boundary war.”32 Lackenbauer also downplays the perceived threat from Russia, claiming that relations have been positive and collaborative.33 He is not naïve, and acknowledges that progress is needed (referencing Russia entering Canadian airspace and secretly entering with submarines) however he argues that this threat is not as significant or serious as Huebert claims.34 In fact, many leading scholars and government officials support this view. Canadian-Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay said there is “no legal threat” to Canada’s sovereignty, “this isn’t the 15th century you cant just go around the world and plant flags and say ‘were claiming this territory’”.35 Franklyn Griffths also states that there is no “real expectation of war among the ice states as a result of conflict originating within the region.”36 The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence in 2011 also stated that “there is no serious challenge to Canada’s ownership of its Arctic land and waters.”37 Ian Kessal, legal advisor to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, further discredits the idea that Canada’s Arctic is a “use it or lose it” situation, he states “you do not lose ownership of something just because you question whether it is secure enough.”38 It is clear that most scholars and officials argue that Canada’s sovereignty is not threatened by other states. However, this does not mean that Canada has no security risks or should do nothing, on the contrary, Canada has many threats to its security and it is greatly in Canada’s interest to participate in a more leading role in Arctic affairs.

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The amount of threats to both Canada, but also the environment and Indigenous populations are numerous and serious. Earlier studies found that the Canadian Arctic was a huge dumping ground for many pollutants and harmful disposals, including from distant regions such as India and the Philippines.39 Due to the changing climate, Indigenous communities are facing major economic and cultural impacts, such as scarcity of food sources and the melting of sea ice.40 There are “serious challenges to human health and food security” among the Indigenous populations in the Arctic.41 The Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans in 2009 stressed the danger both to the Inuit, but also to wildlife including the drastic risk to polar bears.42 Due to consequences of climate change, the increase in shipping, the increase in traffic, and the increase in potential pollution, Canada has an obligation and interest to enforce its sovereign authority in the North. Not due to a military enemy or serious threat to its sovereignty, but due to the many serious risks to its social, environmental, and economic security as a result of the changing political and environmental foundation. Canada must enforce its sovereignty, regulate the North, and provide surveillance, logistics, and support in order to ensure the safety of all Canadians, the safety of northern residents including the Indigenous, and the safety of the environment. One reason Canada needs to be more active in the North is to provide better emergency response in times of crisis, such as shipping accidents. The Chief of the Air Staff, Lieutenant-General André Deschamps said that “Canada has the largest search and rescue area in the world”; which is about 15 million square kilometres.43 Due to this, Canada needs the logistic capabilities to effectively provide quick and efficient search and rescue abilities with its Coast Guard. Furthermore, with the opening of the water ways, gangs and criminal activity has seen a spike in the Arctic, an example includes in 2007 when the Norwegian Hells Angels made it as far as Cambridge Bay on a boat.44 An increase in policing and enforcement is crucial with the increase in traffic, both legal and illegal. Michael Byers, a leading scholar on Canada’s Arctic gives multiple reasons as to why Canada should protect and lead in the Arctic. He stresses that by being present, well equipped, and showing stronger jurisdiction and sovereign enforcement, Canada can ensure environmental protection against oil spills, as well as provide accountability towards polluters.45 Canada can regulate responsible fisheries, as well as provide safety and support to northern inhabitants, both the Indigenous as well as the wildlife.46 Furthermore, by increasing its presence, Canada can provide better legal protection, policing, search and rescue services, and scientific research.47 There has even been a significant increase in Arctic tourism which again would greatly benefit from Canadian regulation.48 Canadian control of the Arctic is crucial to ensure that the changing dynamics and introduction of new trade routes and economic developments are properly regulated and monitored. This is why Canada has consistently denied the US and the rest of the world to call the Northwest Passage an international strait, by doing so, the region becomes significantly less regulated and controlled. As an international strait, military submarines would not have to surface and alert Canada, and military aircraft could use the airspace above the passage without Canada’s consent.49 This lack of restriction and regulation on navigation is threatening in the traditional military sense, but also due to the potential for the strait to be used for illegal activities such as drug and weapon smuggling.50 Gerrard Kenney in his book Dangerous Passage makes an important note, the ice does not need to completely melt for the Northwest Passage to become completely navigable, especially with the increase in icebreaking ships.51 Since the Arctic will have more ships, more businesses, and more activity, Canada needs to ensure that the actions within this space are legal, safe, regulated, and held accountable. It is important to frame concepts of national security under the lenses of environmental and social safety, by focusing on only military defence, attention and spending is allocated to an area of less immediate importance according to many academics and government officials. Canada does not need only more troops in the Arctic, it needs ice breakers, infrastructure, coast guards, legal standards, and enforced regulations.

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Wilfred Grieves argues that there is a major problem with giving sovereign and military concerns the main priority in the government. By making traditional national security the key policy initiative, it means that almost all of the expenditure and funding goes to military and defence, rather than on the multitude of proven security concerns.52 He states, “Canada’s approach to Arctic security remains preoccupied with traditional, state-centric military threats, despite the fact,” he stresses, “that no such military threats exist.”53 Furthermore, Canadian public perception is also aligned with this thinking. A public survey conducted in 2010 demonstrated that Canadian’s primary concerns in the Arctic was the environment, with national security ranked last.54 It is important that Canadians take the Arctic seriously, along with its security concerns and its changing setting for state and business interests. Lackenbauer states that Canada can focus on “sustainable development, constructive circumpolar engagement and environmental protection, without sacrificing either sovereignty or security.”55 Which ultimately is Canada’s goal in its Northern Arctic Strategy.56 Canada needs to lead in collaboration with other Arctic states to continue establishing a legitimate Arctic ruling structure which appropriately addresses the claims and interests of all Arctic countries. An example of a shared collaborative project within the Arctic community is the disposing of Russia’s aged nuclear fleet, including cleaning and securing its abandoned ports and sunken submarines.57 Another example of a shared collaboration that Canada is involved in and should continue to lead in is the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme which monitors pollution risks and impacts on Arctic ecosystems.58 Canada can also influence the Arctic by using the already existing policies within the National Energy Board of Canada regarding offshore oil drilling, and leading this type of accountable responsible extraction regulation more broadly within the Arctic Council.59 Canada has the opportunity to become a major actor and influencer in a region of the world which undoubtedly will increasingly become an area of development and growth.

Griffiths argues that Canada needs to lead in Arctic stewardship, in which “locally informed governance not only polices but also shows respect and care for the natural environment and living things in it.”60 This is the best position for Canada, to lead in agenda-setting and decision making, to collaborate with other Arctic states, to enforce laws and regulations, and to do this with the mindset of protecting the environment, the animals who live there, and ensuring to create “healthy and sustainable Northern communities.”61

In conclusion, Canada does have a sovereign claim to the Arctic, and while there is room for peaceful trustworthy progress, there is no serious threat to its sovereign claims. However, Canada must also remain firm and vigilant; increased pressure from actors pushing for Canada to allow internal waters to become international must be strictly denied and/or appropriately negotiated.62 Due to the changing climate opening up waterways and the increase in state as well as business interest in the north, Canada needs to actively participate in both enforcing its legitimacy and control over its own territory, but also in leading the global community to ensure it is at the center of decision making and agenda-setting which will result in higher levels of security for Canadians. The Arctic will be a major area of global interest in the near future, it is up to Canada to ensure this interest is well guided, legal, safe, and prosperous.

 Written By: Daniel Govedar (November 2015)

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 Endnotes

  1. Loyd, Trevor. 1970. “Some International Aspects of Arctic Canada.” International Journal, Vol. 25, No. 4
. Canadian International Council. Pg. 727
  2. S. 1947. “The Arctic Frontier and its Defence.” The World Today, Vol. 3, No. 7. Royal Institute of International Affairs. Pg. 297
  3. Ibid
  4. Dittmann, LCol. Paul. 2009. “In Defence of Defence: Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 11, No. 3. Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. Pg. 6
  5. Loyd, Trevor. Pg. 717
  6. Dittmann, LCol. Paul. Pg. 5
  7. Ibid
  8. Ibid
  9. “Canada: Statement Concerning Arctic Sovereignty – House of Commons 1983.” International Legal Materials, Vol. 24, No. 6. American Society of International Law.
Pg. 3
  10. Huebert, Rob. 1993. “Canadian Arctic Security Issues: Transformation in the Post-Cold War Era.” International Journal, Vol. 54, No. 2
. Canadian International Council. Pg. 206
  11. Loyd, Trevor. Pg. 724
  12. Huebert, Rob. 1993. “Canadian Arctic Security Issues: Transformation in the Post-Cold War Era.” Pg. 205
  13. Huebert, Rob. 1993. “Canadian Arctic Security Issues: Transformation in the Post-Cold War Era.” Pg. 208
  14. Dittmann, LCol. Paul. Pg. 6
  15. National Snow and Ice Data Center. 2007. “Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows.” Web.
  16. Ibid
  17. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. 2009 “From Polar Race to Polar Saga: An Integrated Strategy for Canada and the Circumpolar World.” Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow, No. 3. Canadian International Council. Pg. 23
  18. Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. 2009. “Rising to the Arctic Challenge: Report on the Canadian Coast Guard.” Canadian Senate, 40th Parliament, 2nd Pg. 21
  19. Huebert, Rob. 2009. “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World.” Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow, No. 4. Canadian International Council. Pg. 3
  20. Ibid
  21. Dittmann, LCol. Paul. Pg. 2
  22. Ibid
  23. Ibid
  24. Parfitt, Tom. 2014. “Russia warns it’s coming for the Arctic’s oil, including an area Canada claims as its own.” National Post. Last Updated Jan 24 2015. Accessed November 21 2015. Web.
  25. Dittmann, LCol. Paul. Pg. 1
  26. Huebert, Rob. 2009. “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World.” Pg. 3
  27. Huebert, Rob. 2009. “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World.” Pg. 9
  28. Huebert, Rob. 2009. “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World.” Pg. 8
  29. Huebert, Rob. 2009. “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World.” Pg. 3
  30. Huebert, Rob. 2009. “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World.” Pg. 13
  31. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. 2009 “From Polar Race to Polar Saga: An Integrated Strategy for Canada and the Circumpolar World.” Pg. 45
  32. Ibid
  33. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. 2010 “Mirror Images? Canada, Russia, and the Circumpolar World.” International Journal, Vol. 65, No. 4. Canadian International Council. Pg. 887
  34. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. 2010 “Mirror Images? Canada, Russia, and the Circumpolar World.” Pg. 888
  35. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. 2010 “Mirror Images? Canada, Russia, and the Circumpolar World.” Pg. 887
  36. Griffiths, Franklyn. 2009. “Towards a Canadian Arctic Strategy.” Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow, No. 1. Canadian International Council. Pg. 13
  37. Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. 2011. “Sovereignty and Security in Canada’s Arctic – Interim Report.” Canadian Senate, 40th Parliament, 3rd Pg. 55
  38. Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Pg. 17
  39. Huebert, Rob. 2009. “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World.” Pg. 13
  40. Huebert, Rob. 2009. “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World.” Pg. 18
  41. Ibid
  42. Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. Pg. 25-26
  43. Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Pg. 25
  44. Huebert, Rob. 2009. “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World.” Pg. 14
  45. Byers, Michael “International Law and the Arctic – Donner Prize 2013.” Donner Prize. YouTube. Published on June 3 2014.
  46. Ibid
  47. Ibid
  48. Lajeunesse, Adam et al. “Canadian Arctic Shipping: Issues and Perspectives.” Centre for Northern Governance and Development. Saskatoon. Pg. 45
  49. Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. Pg. 43
  50. Ibid
  51. Kenney, Gerard I. 2006. “Dangerous Passage: Issues in the Arctic.” Natural Heritage. Toronto. Pg. 179
  52. Grieves, Wilfred. 2012. “From whom, from what? Canada’s Arctic policy and the narrowing of human security.” International Journal, Vol. 67, No. 1, Charting the New Turkish Foreign Policy. Pg. 230
  53. Ibid
  54. Grieves, Wilfred. Pg. 233
  55. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. 2009 “From Polar Race to Polar Saga: An Integrated Strategy for Canada and the Circumpolar World.” Pg. 3
  56. “Canada’s Northern Strategy.” Government of Canada. Last Updated April 14 2015. Accessed November 20 2016. Web.
  57. Huebert, Rob. 1993. “Canadian Arctic Security Issues: Transformation in the Post-Cold War Era.” Pg. 225
  58. Nilsson, Annika, et al. 2009. “Arctic Pollution 2009.” Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme. Oslo. Pg. 7
  59. National Energy Board Canada. 2011. “ Filing Requirements of Offshore Drilling in the Canadian Arctic.” National Energy Board. Pg. 2
  60. Griffiths, Franklyn. Pg. 3
  61. Expert Panel on the Canadian Arctic Research Initiative. 2008. “Vision for the Canadian Arctic Research Initiative: Assessing the Opportunities.” Council of Canadian Academies. Ottawa. Web. Pg. 15
  62. Lackenbauer, Whitney. 2011. “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security: Historical Perspectives.” Center for Military and Strategic Studies. Calgary. Pg. 397

 

Primary Sources

 Arctic Council. 2013. “Canada’s Arctic Council Chairmanship 2013-2015.” Government of Canada. Web. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2014/maecd-dfatd/FR5-83-2013-eng.pdf

“Canada’s Northern Strategy.” Government of Canada. Last Updated April 14 2015. Accessed November 20 2016. Web. http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/index-eng.asp

“Canada: Statement Concerning Arctic Sovereignty – House of Commons 1983.” International Legal Materials, Vol. 24, No. 6. American Society of International Law
. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20692914

National Energy Board Canada. 2011. “ Filing Requirements of Offshore Drilling in the Canadian Arctic.” National Energy Board. Web. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/one-neb/NE23-167-1-2011-eng.pdf

National Snow and Ice Data Center. 2007. “Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows.” Web. http://nsidc.org/news/newsroom/2007_seaiceminimum/20071001_pressrelease.html

Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. 2009. “Rising to the Arctic Challenge: Report on the Canadian Coast Guard.” Canadian Senate, 40th Parliament, 2nd Session.

Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. 2011. “Sovereignty and Security in Canada’s Arctic – Interim Report.” Canadian Senate, 40th Parliament, 3rd Session.

Parfitt, Tom. 2014. “Russia warns it’s coming for the Arctic’s oil, including an area Canada claims as its own.” National Post. Last Updated Jan 24 2015. Accessed November 21 2015. Web. http://news.nationalpost.com/news/russia-warns-its-coming-for-the-arctics-oil-including-an-area-canada-claims-as-its-own 

Secondary Sources 

Byers, Michael “International Law and the Arctic – Donner Prize 2013.” Donner Prize. YouTube. Published on June 3 2014. https://youtu.be/vtBTWKlTfwY

Dittmann, LCol. Paul. 2009. “In Defence of Defence: Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3. Centre for Military and Strategic Studies.

Ed. Lackenbauer, Whitney. 2011. “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security: Historical Perspectives.” Center for Military and Strategic Studies. Calgary.
Expert Panel on the Canadian Arctic Research Initiative. 2008. “Vision for the Canadian Arctic Research Initiative: Assessing the Opportunities.” Council of Canadian Academies. Ottawa. Web. http://books1.scholarsportal.info.libaccess.lib.mcmaster.ca/viewdoc.html?id=/ebooks/ebooks0/gibson_cppc/2010-08-06/1/10264667

Huebert, Rob. 1993. “Canadian Arctic Security Issues: Transformation in the Post-Cold War Era.” International Journal, Vol. 54, No. 2
. Canadian International Council. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40203373

Huebert, Rob. 2009. “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World.” Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow, No. 4. Canadian International Council.

Kenney, Gerard I. 2006. “Dangerous Passage: Issues in the Arctic.” Natural Heritage. Toronto.

Grieves, Wilfrid. 2012. “From whom, from what? Canada’s Arctic policy and the narrowing of human security.” International Journal, Vol. 67, No. 1, Charting the New Turkish Foreign Policy. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23265975

Griffiths, Franklyn. 2009. “Towards a Canadian Arctic Strategy.” Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow, No. 1. Canadian International Council.

Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. 2009 “From Polar Race to Polar Saga: An Integrated Strategy for Canada and the Circumpolar World.” Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow, No. 3. Canadian International Council.

Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. 2010 “Mirror Images? Canada, Russia, and the Circumpolar World.” International Journal, Vol. 65, No. 4. Canadian International Council. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25762046

Lajeunesse, Adam et al. “Canadian Arctic Shipping: Issues and Perspectives.” Centre for Northern Governance and Development. Saskatoon.

Loyd, Trevor. 1970. “Some International Aspects of Arctic Canada.” International Journal, Vol. 25, No. 4
. Canadian International Council. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40200952

Nilsson, Annika, et al. 2009. “Arctic Pollution 2009.” Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme. Oslo.

S.S. 1947. “The Arctic Frontier and its Defence.” The World Today, Vol. 3, No. 7. Royal Institute of International Affairs
. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40392034
 

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