The Iran-Contra Scandal

Contradictions, Disarray and a Case for Impeachment

The purpose of this essay is to analyze the Iran-Contra Scandal and to argue whether the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, deserved impeachment as a consequence. The format for this paper will be as follows; first a general historical overview will be established to contextualize the conflicts and circumstances of the scandal. This will include an understanding of the key factors and players in the scandal such as: the Nicaraguan Contras, the Iranian government, American hostages, and congressional legislation such as “The Boland Agreement.” After a strong contextual foundation is established, this paper will analyze and describe the event known as the Iran-Contra Scandal. This paper will look at what this specific controversy entails, as well as why the opponents responded with such anger and critique. Furthermore, this paper will look at the broader implications of what this scandal meant to the American political system. This paper will examine the conflict between the congressional and executive branches, as well as the issue of accountability. Finally, this paper will argue that President Reagan should have been impeached due to the scandal, and why he wasn’t. 

To understand the Iran-Contra Scandal, two nations must be understood and contextualized: Nicaragua and Iran. During the early 1980s Nicaragua was led by a newly established government known as the Sandanistas.¹ The Sandinistas were openly despised by the US government and especially the Reagan administration. Their were two publicly stated reasons that the US gave for wanting to support the guerrilla forces who were fighting against the Sandanistas. First that the guerrillas, known as Contras, were “freedom fighters”, and secondly that arms smuggling within South America, especially to and from Nicaraguan and the Salvadoran guerrillas, was “harming US national security interests.”² In November of 1981 this reasoning was used to justify sending funds to support the Contras, starting with nearly $20 million USD, then followed by additional funds.³ Congress halted this official support in its tracks upon the revelation that CIA agents, in support of the Nicaraguan Contras, had placed illegal explosive mines within Nicaraguan harbour ports.⁴ To prevent the Reagan administration from funding the Contras, the US Congress passed the “Boland Amendment” in 1984 which became law in 1985.⁵ Very notably in the Amendment is Sec. 8066. (a), which in part states, “During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.”⁶ This section is crucial in regards to the legality of the Iran-Contra Scandal and will be referenced to later in this paper.

The second country to understand is Iran. Iran during the time period of this scandal was engaged in a war against Iraq and also still recovering from its political, social and religious revolution. Officially, the United States was against the Iranian government and placed embargos on the country, forbidding trade and weapons sales.⁷ The United States had established a strict policy barring the sale of arms to countries sponsoring terrorism; officially Iran was on this list.⁸ Iran’s role in this story is in relation to another incident that took place in the Middle East. From 1984 to 1985, seven US citizens were kidnapped by the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah, which has ties to the Iranian government.⁹ These American hostages were to become a centrepiece in the scandal.

Lastly, to make sense of the Iran-Contra Scandal we must understand the United States in this time period and especially the relevant individuals, which include: the former National Security Council Advisor McFarlane, followed by Admiral Poindexter, also Attorney General Meese, Secretary of State Schultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, CIA Director Casey, staff member Lt Col Oliver North, and lastly the President, Ronald Reagan.¹⁰ Together these US political actors, Nicaraguan Contras, the government of Iran, and 7 US hostages converged to become known as the Iran-Contra Scandal. This paper will examine how this scandal came to be, who was involved, the legality of the incident, and why the President of the United States should have been impeached.

Before diving into the complex and contradictory information about the scandal, it is best to sum up the incident by using an official White House statement that “a secret plan had been hatched by the Reagan administration to provide up to $30 million to the Nicaraguan Contra rebels from profits gained by selling arms to Iran.”¹¹ In exchange for the sale of arms, the US also demanded the release of the seven hostages taken by Hezbollah. The issue of the hostages, originally the hardest aspect of the scandal to prove, was a major factor in the sale of arms to Iran. Reagan in his address to the nation after the revelations stated, “I let my personal concern for the hostages spill over into the geopolitical strategy of reaching out to Iran.”¹² The plan was that the US would sell arms to Iran, get back the hostages, and then channel those funds to support the Contras. The way in which this was done, the question of legality, and the problem of accountability, is why this turned into a major scandal.

In mid-1986 following media coverage of a shot down plane delivering supplies to the Contras, information leaked about sale of arms to Iran.¹³ The initial response of the White House was denial. When reporters confirmed the sale of arms, President Reagan changed his response and “admitted that weapons were sold, but only a few”.¹⁴ When that was proven to be a lie, the President then committed to launching an investigation claiming that he was unaware and angry about the incident.¹⁵

Evidence revealed later suggests that this was far from unusual behavior. The United States all through the early 1980s was involved in channeling arms through the Middle East, often using Pakistan as a backdoor and many times leading to another group, the Afghan Mujaheddin.¹⁶ As the arms sale controversy began to surface and gain attention in the press, an alarming second scandal emerged that the “profits from the Iranian deal had been diverted to the Contras.”¹⁷

When the investigations began the “members of the Reagan administration offered a variety of accounts for the Iran-Contra affair”.¹⁸ Lies, denials, finger pointing, and scapegoating became the norm. This leads us to two possible conclusions about President Reagan; he was either guilty of breaking laws and lying to the American Congress and people, or guilty of leading an administration based on incompetence, ignorance, lies, and corruption. Attempts to charge Reagan with any crimes proved to be a failure even after forty days of questioning, which historian Amiya Rao argues, resulted in “numerous contradictions” unsolved, and “no coherent and complete account that could be elicited.”¹⁹

As noted above, Congress banned the transfer of funds to the Contras in the Boland Amendment. Members of the Reagan administration knowingly ignored this amendment and found alternative ways to fund the Contras. One of the key actors being investigated was Lt Col North; he argued that “the Boland Amendment did not apply to the Presidents Staff.”²⁰ This paper argues that this is false and that the Reagan administration committed an illegal offense. Since the administration knew it was illegal to fund the Contras directly, they used their reprogramming authority. This allowed them to move funds from one project to another without the approval of congress. This included transfers from private investors, foreign contributors, and in this case, the illegal sale of arms to Iran.²¹ Within the Boland Amendment, it states that no “entity involved in intelligence activities” is allowed to fund the Contras.²² Within the National Security Act it states that the CIA is established under the National Security Council.²³ Louis Fisher argues that “How can a subordinate body (the CIA) be involved in intelligence activities but not the controlling agency (the NSC)?”²⁴ Furthermore, in Executive Order No.12,333 it states that the National Security Council “shall act as the highest Executive Branch entity that provides review of, guidance for, and direction to, the conduct of all national foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and special activities [covert operations], and attendant policies and programs.”²⁵ This was issued by President Reagan himself. Reagan signed a document that the NSC is the highest power in control of intelligence, Congress issued an Amendment that no intelligence entity is allowed to fund the Contras, the Reagan administration indirectly but knowingly funded the Contras behind the backs of Congress, and therefore the Reagan administration is guilty of breaking the law.

The sale of arms to Iran is proven and clear. The negotiation to trade the hostages has been more difficult to vindicate. Part of the reason that there is so much confusion is that the Reagan administration actively lied, told contradictory accounts, and admitted to keeping Congress in the dark. The President of the United States has either two possible roles in this scenario; he either approved of illegal actions, or he lead an administration in which much of his senior staff were lying, corrupt, and incompetent. Poindexter “disclosed that President Reagan himself approved of the bargaining offer to get the hostages back.”²⁶ Schultz later denied the Presidents knowledge of the hostages.²⁷ North, when asked if he knew of any documents that suggest the President approved any funds, denied it entirely, which later proved to be false.²⁸ Col North claimed he had full approvals with everything he did, McFarlane contradicted this claiming “I had not approved all of Col North’s actions.”²⁸ It became clear that North had become the scapegoat for the President. Rao argues that North “gave a complete cover up to the President.”²⁹ While in trial North said, “if this whole thing came down to creating political controversy or embarrassment I would be the scapegoat”, asked for whom his reply was, “for whoever necessary, for the administration, for the president, for whoever high up the chain that they needed to say that’s the guy who did it.”³⁰ Poindexter alarmingly stated, “my objective all along was to with-hold from Congress exactly what the NSC staff was doing.”³¹ In fact, the entire reason this scandal was under the ring of covert operations wasn’t for the secrecy or protection of government agents or national security, but was done specifically to hide from and lie to Congress. Kornbluh and Parry argue in their assessment of the lies and misinformation prevalent in the Iran-Contra scandal that “without accurate, honest information, citizens cannot participate meaningfully in democracy and cannot hold government officials accountable.”³² This is what occurred in the Iran-Contra scandal, poor information and lies lead to a lack of accountability. When the committee investigating the scandal asked North to show the documents which “indicate that the President had approved an Iran arms shipment in November 19, 1985”, North shockingly said that he “tore it up” and “threw it in his burnbag.”³³ He states he did this because “it is the responsibility of the president’s men to protect their leader.”³⁴ The evidence suggests a cover up of Reagan’s knowledge and actions.

One of the leaders aiming to attribute accountability towards President Reagan is Independent Counsel Walsh. In his 1997 memoir “Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover Up” he dives into the illegal actions of the Reagan administration. While difficult to prove due to the suspicious behavior of the administration and also the destruction of documents, evidence still suggests that Reagan approved the sale of arms for cash and for the release of hostages.³⁶ Reagan’s administration made a mockery of the United States’ principle of not negotiating with terrorists and even Reagan’s own repeated statement “no concessions to terrorists.”³⁷ Walsh, among many others, argue that “Reagan was within range of impeachment.”³⁸ Gray Cavender, Nancy Jurik, and Albert Cohen also agree with this; in their work on the scandal they write “the administration violated its own policy against negotiating with terrorists, and the President failed to notify Congress of the arms sale, as the law requires.”³⁹ Reagan, and his administration, violated the Arms Export Control Act, the National Security Act, the Boland Agreement, and lied to both Congress and the public, so the question arises; should he have been impeached?⁴⁰ Impeachment in the United States is a rare and serious matter. By impeachment this paper uses the definition of “a political trial that is authorized by a legislative body and is conducted by a separate political institution” in order to remove a leader such as a President from their position.⁴¹ The impeachment process is embedded in the US Constitution, it is a formal charge. Only the House of Representatives has the power to initiate an impeachment and the Senate is the one that conducts the process.⁴² While no formal impeachment charge was ever laid out in the House of Representatives against Reagan, the idea sprang into debate frequently and launched subsequent investigations, including by Counsel Walsh.⁴³ Furthermore, the House and the Senate both conducted their own hearings in 1987 and further searched for a conclusive answer in the scandal.⁴⁴ These were different than the previous official investigation by the administration. Following the media coverage of the scandal, Reagan established a group called “The Tower Commission” to investigate the allegations, however it had only a few months to complete the work and also “had virtually no legal powers to investigate, it could not subpoena documents, compel testimony or grant immunity.”⁴⁵ These new investigations uncovered significant evidence and lead to the trial of many members of the administration, however the “smoking gun” to convict the President was never found.

This paper argues that the President indeed should have been impeached from his position. As stated previously, this scandal has essentially two possible conclusions: either the President knowingly broke laws, or he lead an administration so poorly that it bred an atmosphere where many senior officials viewed breaking the law as an acceptable and encouraged practice. Rao agrees with this point, even if Reagan didn’t directly approve the actions, the investigations showed an “administration in complete disarray” she continues, there was “infighting, backstabbing, grabbing of power, whispering campaign against inconvenient colleagues, a kind of guerrilla war.”⁴⁶ The administration broke laws, destroyed evidence, hurt their global credibility, worked with terrorists, and lied to the American Congress and people. The policies implemented in the Persian Gulf during the mid-1980s and in Nicaragua were against Reagan’s “publicly stated and understood intent.”⁴⁷ Article Two Section 3 of the US Constitution includes that one of the Presidents few constitutionally written duties is to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”⁴⁸ Ronald Reagan failed in this duty. He failed to run an honorable administration and his leadership resulted in a political and international crisis. Kornbluh further articulates this thinking that “the Reagan administration created or at least tolerated an environment where disdain for the law and pervasive dishonesty became routine bureaucratic procedure.”⁴⁹ If many scholars and investigators put blame on Reagan, then why was he not impeached? A few key reasons circulate in the academic literature. First that no official “smoking gun” was ever found to formally charge Reagan, secondly that the media and many politicians supported Reagan, and thirdly that the public simply didn’t care very much. Hinojosa and Perez-Linan write that, “In the absence of a way to directly tie the President to the actions, blame fell on other members of the executive branch, many of whom were prosecuted (and some convicted) for their crimes.”⁵⁰ While it was believed he broke the law, and testimonies would often account for it, no definitive final charge was ever made against the President. Secondly, the media and others supported the President. The loyalty to the President was clear with officials such as North explicitly stating that they would take the blame and protect the President.⁵¹ Furthermore news agencies such as the New York Times and CBS had very few stories which were critical of the President; of the many that were published regarding the scandal few framed the conversation in ways to make the President appear guilty.⁵² Senator Nunn told the press, “we must work to help the President restore credibility”⁵³ and Correspondent Phil Jones noticed that the scandal “prompted a curious sort of congressional rally around the Presidency.”⁵⁴ Arguably the most important reason that Reagan was not impeached is simply that the public did not care very much. The scandal led to the largest ever single month drop in presidential approval rating.⁵⁴ Shortly after this however, the public quickly got over it and stopped caring. The majority of the public felt that the President had lied about the scandal and also that Reagan knew of events, or approved them, much earlier than he had admitted to, however “barely a third ever thought the President should consider resigning.”⁵⁵ Hinojosa and Perez-Linan explain that “the allegations appeared to the public to be technically correct but politically irrelevant, and the President, even without a congressional majority, was safe.”⁵⁶ Quickly the public moved on from the issue, and the President escaped accountability. Curiously, while this paper argues that the President should have been impeached for his actions and poor leadership, the American public were against this notion. In one respect, if the American public supports the President, impeachment becomes difficult because it’s the House of Representatives and the Senate who have to conduct the impeachment, if the public supports the President it would seem a risk to counter the general consensus, even if clear laws were broken.

Before this paper concludes it’s also important to look at the broader implications and revelations of this scandal. What this scandal demonstrated, besides the clear problems with the Reagan administration, was also a potential problem with the policies of US covert operations, as well as a major tension between the congressional and executive branches. The central theme of the scandal, is that the executive officials lied to, and avoided accountability from, the legislative congressional branch. Kornbluh states that “the constitution demands executive branch accountability to the legislative branch.”⁵⁸ This scandal demonstrates a lack of accountability, the executive branch acted above the law and above the constitution, it conducted covert operations which were in direct conflict with the principles and laws of the United States. This incident according to John Canham-Clyne, challenged the idea that institutional secrecy and executive covert operations can operate or belong within a democratic system.⁵⁹ He argues that the “numerous layers of deniability and officially sanctioned lying often make it difficult for U.S. citizens to apprehend even the barest outline of policies created in their name.”⁶⁰ This made it difficult for congress or the public to truly understand what happened or who was accountable. Not only is there the problem of lawlessness and lack of accountability, this scandal also demonstrated the level of rampant corruption in the White House administrative culture. Morton Halperin echoes Canham-Clyne’s thinking that Reagan “fostered a policy and environment where he was not accountable to Congress or the American people.”⁶¹ Essentially the National Security Council operated under a level of corruption where the checks in place to control executive power on foreign affairs were eroded. Halperin argues an alternative to outright lying to congress for covert operations can be as simple as establishing a parallel structure in order to get consultation and approval from congressional advisors.⁶² Not only did the Iran-Contra scandal lead to debates over the legitimacy and guilt of the President Reagan, but further it ruptured the trust of the entire National Security Council.

In conclusion, the Iran-Contra scandal was a covert operation carried out by the National Security Agency without the approval of Congress. Its purpose was to illegally sell arms to Iran, in return receive the release of seven American hostages captured by Hezbollah, furthermore the funds from the arms sales would then be directed to illegally fund the Contras in Nicaragua. Multiple members of the administration were charged (most were pardoned later), while a “smoking gun” to convict the President was never found. The evidence suggests that Reagan had some involvement and approval. Accordingly, even if the President had zero knowledge, the atmosphere and environment under his leadership was evidently based on lawlessness, deception and anti-democratic principles. Reagan failed as a President to uphold the rule of law and his executive administration lied to the public and to Congress. The scandal created a tension between the congressional and executive branches, devaluing the Presidency, the National Security Council, and the principles of liberty and law which they swore to uphold and protect. For leading an administration which broke laws, lied, and attempted to cover up a foreign affairs scandal, President Reagan should have been impeached.

End Notes

1. Marshall, Jordan et al. The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era. Black Rose Books ltd: 1987
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Marshall, Jordan et al. The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era. pp. 11
5. “The 1984 Boland Agreement.” Further Continuning Appropriations Resolutoon For Fiscal Year 1985 (P.L.98-473). Aug. 23, 1985. National Security Council. Washington DC.
6. Ibid
7. Block, Alan A. The Organized Crime Community: Essays in the Honor of Alan A. Block. Ed. Frank Bovenkerk and Michael Levi. New York: Springer, 2007
8. Hinojosa, Victor J. & Perez-Linan, Anibal S. “Presidential Survival and the Impeachment Process: The United States and Colombia.” Political Science Quarterly, 121, No. 4 (Winter, 2006/2007), pp 669
9. Cavender, Gray et al. “The Baffling Case of the Smoking Gun: The Social Ecology of Political Accounts in the Iran-Contra Affair.” Social Problems, Vol. 40, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp 152
10. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 22, No. 38 (Sep. 19, 1987), pp. 1594
11. Woody & Klien. All the Presidents’ Spokesmen: Spinning the News-Press Secretaries from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to George W. Bush. Westport: Greenworld Publishing Group, 2008. pp 144
12. Woody & Klien. All the Presidents’ Spokesmen: Spinning the News-Press Secretaries from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to George W. Bush. pp.149
13. Cavender, Gray et al. “The Baffling Case of the Smoking Gun: The Social Ecology of Political Accounts in the Iran-Contra Affair.” pp.155
14. Ibid
15. Ibid
16. Canham-Clyne, John. “Business as Usual: Iran-Contra and the National Security State.” World Policy Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall – Winter, 1992), pp. 627
17. Cavender, Gray et al. “The Baffling Case of the Smoking Gun: The Social Ecology of Political Accounts in the Iran-Contra Affair.” pp.155
18. Ibid
19. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” pp. 1594
20. Ibid
21. Sharpe, Kenneth E. “The Real Cause of Irangate.” Foreign Policy, No. 68 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 33
22. “The 1984 Boland Agreement.”
23. Fisher, Louis. “How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 83, No. 4, The United States Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign Affairs (Oct., 1989), pp. 760
24. Ibid
25. Ibid
26. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” pp. 1594
27. Ibid
28. Ibid
29. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” pp. 1595
30. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” pp. 1594
31. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” pp. 1595
32. Kornbluh, Peter. “The Iran-Contra Scandal: A Postmortem.” World Policy Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter, 1987/1988), pp. 146
33. Parry, Robert. & Kornbluh, Peter. “Iran-Contras Untold Story.” Foreign Policy, 72 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 29
34. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” pp. 1595
35. Ibid
36. Block, Alan A. The Organized Crime Community: Essays in the Honor of Alan A. Block. pp.4
37. Ibid
38. Ibid
39. Cavender, Gray et al. “The Baffling Case of the Smoking Gun: The Social Ecology of Political Accounts in the Iran-Contra Affair.” pp.152
40. Block, Alan A. The Organized Crime Community: Essays in the Honor of Alan A. Block. pp.4
41. Hinojosa, Victor J. & Perez-Linan, Anibal S. “Presidential Survival and the Impeachment Process: The United States and Colombia.” pp. 665
42. Ibid
43. Hinojosa, Victor J. & Perez-Linan, Anibal S. “Presidential Survival and the Impeachment Process: The United States and Colombia.” pp. 669
44. Ibid
45. Block, Alan A. The Organized Crime Community: Essays in the Honor of Alan A. Block. pp.2
46. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” pp. 1596
47. Canham-Clyne, John. “Business as Usual: Iran-Contra and the National Security State.” pp. 628
48. S. Constitution. art. 2. sec. 3. cl. 1.
49. Kornbluh, Peter. “The Iran-Contra Scandal: A Postmortem.” pp. 129
50. Hinojosa, Victor J. & Perez-Linan, Anibal S. “Presidential Survival and the Impeachment Process: The United States and Colombia.” pp. 670
51. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” pp. 1594
52. Brody, Richard A. & Shapiro, Catherine R. “Policy Failure and Public Support: The Iran-Contra Affair and Public Assessment of President Reagan.” Political Behavior, 11, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 363
53. Ibid
54. Ibid
55. Hinojosa, Victor J. & Perez-Linan, Anibal S. “Presidential Survival and the Impeachment Process: The United States and Colombia.” pp. 670
56. Ibid
57. Ibid
58. Kornbluh, Peter. “The Iran-Contra Scandal: A Postmortem.” pp. 158
59. Canham-Clyne, John. “Business as Usual: Iran-Contra and the National Security State.” pp. 617
60. Ibid
61. Halperin, Morton H. “Lawful Wars.” Foreign Policy, 72 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 176-177
62. Halperin, Morton H. “Lawful Wars.” Foreign Policy, 72 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 178

Work Cited

Brody, Richard A. & Shapiro, Catherine R. “Policy Failure and Public Support: The Iran-Contra Affair and Public Assessment of President Reagan.” Political Behavior, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 353-369

Block, Alan A. The Organized Crime Community: Essays in the Honor of Alan A. Block. Ed. Frank Bovenkerk and Michael Levi. New York: Springer, 2007.

Canham-Clyne, John. “Business as Usual: Iran-Contra and the National Security State.” World Policy Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall – Winter, 1992), pp. 617-637

Cavender, Gray et al. “The Baffling Case of the Smoking Gun: The Social Ecology of Political Accounts in the Iran-Contra Affair.” Social Problems, Vol. 40, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 152-166

Fisher, Louis. “How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 83, No. 4, The United States Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign Affairs (Oct., 1989), pp. 758-766

Halperin, Morton H. “Lawful Wars.” Foreign Policy, No. 72 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 173-195

Hinojosa, Victor J. & Perez-Linan, Anibal S. “Presidential Survival and the Impeachment Process: The United States and Colombia.” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 121, No. 4 (Winter, 2006/2007), pp. 653-675

Koh, Harold Hongju. “Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair.” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 97, No. 7 (Jun., 1988), pp. 1255-13

Kornbluh, Peter. “The Iran-Contra Scandal: A Postmortem.” World Policy Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter, 1987/1988), pp. 129-150

Marshall, Jordan et al. The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era. Black Rose Books ltd: 1987

Parry, Robert. & Kornbluh, Peter. “Iran-Contras Untold Story.” Foreign Policy, No. 72 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 3-30
Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 22, No. 38 (Sep. 19, 1987), pp. 1594-1596.

Sharpe, Kenneth E. “The Real Cause of Irangate.” Foreign Policy, No. 68 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 19-41

“The 1984 Boland Agreement.” Further Continuning Appropriations Resolutoon For Fiscal Year 1985 (P.L.98-473). Aug. 23, 1985. National Security Council. Washington DC. Uploaded By: Brown University. Web. https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/documents/d-nic-21.pdf

U.S. Constitution. art. 2. sec. 3. cl. 1.

Woody & Klien. All the Presidents’ Spokesmen: Spinning the News-Press Secretaries from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to George W. Bush. Westport: Greenworld Publishing Group, 2008.

Written By: Daniel Govedar (March 2015, Edited July 2018)