The Iran-Contra Scandal

The Iran-Contra Scandal: 

Contradictions, Disarray and a Case for Impeachment

The purpose of this essay is to analyze the Iran-Contra Scandal and to argue whether the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, deserved impeachment as a consequence. The format for this paper will be as follows; first a general historical overview will be established to contextualize the conflicts and circumstances of the scandal. This will include an understanding of the key factors and players in the scandal such as: the Nicaraguan Contras, the Iranian government, American hostages, and congressional legislation such as “The Boland Agreement.” After a strong contextual foundation is established, this paper will analyze and describe the event known as the Iran-Contra Scandal. This paper will look at what this specific controversy entails, as well as why the opponents responded with such anger and critique. Furthermore, this paper will look at the broad implications of what this scandal means to the American political system. This paper will examine the conflict between the congressional and executive branches, as well as the issue of accountability. Finally, this paper will argue that President Reagan should have been impeached due to the scandal, and accordingly, why he wasn’t. By this paper’s conclusion, a rich understanding of the scandal will be demonstrated. With this understanding an educated and confident basis for the President’s impeachment will be argued.

To understand the Iran-Contra Scandal, two unlikely nations need to be understood and contextualized: Nicaragua and Iran. During the early 1980s Nicaragua was led by a newly established government known as the Sandanistas.1 The Sandinistas were openly despised by the US government and especially the Reagan administration, who wanted them removed. The publically stated reason for wanting to enter the conflict and support the guerrilla forces against the Sandanistas was based on two ideas: first that the guerrillas, known as Contras, were “freedom fighters” and secondly, that arms smuggling within South America, especially to and from Nicaraguan and the Salvadoran guerrillas was “harming US national security interests.”2 In November of 1981 this reasoning was used for the justification to begin sending funds to support the Contras, starting with nearly $20 million USD, then followed by additional funds.3 Congress halted this official support in its tracks upon the revelation that CIA agents, in support of the Nicaraguan Contras, had placed explosive mines within Nicaraguan harbour ports.4 To prevent the Reagan administration from continuing its funding of the Contras, the US Congress passed the “Boland Amendment” in 1984 which became law in 1985.5 Very notably in the Amendment is Sec. 8066. (a), which in part states, “During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.”6 This section is crucially significant in regards to the legality of the Iran-Contra Scandal and will be referenced to later in this paper.

The second country and situation to understand is Iran. Iran during the time period of this scandal was engaged in a war against Iraq and also still resoldifying after its political, social and religious revolution. Officially, the United States was against the Iranian government and placed embargos on the country, forbidding trade and weapons sales.7 The United States had established a strict policy barring the sale of arms to countries sponsoring terrorism; officially Iran was on this list.8 Iran’s role in this scandal is in relation to another incident in the Middle East. From 1984 to 1985, seven US citizens were kidnapped by the Lebanese terrorist group, Hezbollah, which has ties to the Iranian government.9 These hostages become a centerpiece in the scandal.

Lastly, to understand the United States in this time period, it is crucial to recognize the key players in the scandal, which include: the former National Security Council Advisor McFarlane, followed by Admiral Poindexter, also Attorney General Meese, Secretary of State Schultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, CIA Director Casey, staff member Lt Col Oliver North, and lastly the President, Ronald Reagan.10 Together these US political actors, Nicaraguan Contras, the government of Iran, and 7 US hostages converged together and became known as the Iran-Contra Scandal. This paper will examine how this scandal came to be, who was involved, the legality of the incident, and why the President of the United States should have been impeached.

Before diving into complex and contradictory information about the scandal, it is best to sum up the incident by using a confirmed White House statement that “a secret plan had been hatched by the Reagan administration to provide up to $30 million to the Nicaraguan Contra rebels from profits gained by selling arms to Iran.”11 In exchange for the sale of arms, the US also demanded the release of the seven hostages taken by Hezbollah; this was argued by many academics and investigators such as Al. A Block and Independent Counsel Walsh. The issue of the hostages, arguably the hardest aspect of this scandal to prove, was evidently a major factor in the sale of arms to Iran. Reagan in his address to the nation after the revelations stated “I let my personal concern for the hostages spill over into the geopolitical strategy of reaching out to Iran.”12 The essential idea behind this would be that the US would sell arms to Iran, and then channel those funds to support the Contras. The way in which this was done, the question of legality, and the problem of accountability is why this transpired into a major scandal. The first aspect this paper will discuss is the sale of arms to Iran. The second aspect we will explore is the illegality of transferring funds to the Contras, as well as how and why this was even done in the first place. Afterwards an in-depth examination will show the level of contradictions, lies, and disregard for the law surrounding the president and his administration.

In mid-1986 following media coverage of a shot down plane delivering supplies to the contras, information leaked about sale of arms to Iran.13 The initial response of the White House was denial, when the media confirmed the arms sales, President Reagan changed his response and “admitted that weapons were sold, but only a few”.14 When that was proven to be a lie, the President then committed to launching an investigation claiming he was unaware and angry of the incident.15 Two major questions which arose from the revelation of arms sales to Iran were: Was this legal, and who is accountable? Further evidence revealed later suggests that this was far from unusual behavior. The United States all through the early 1980s was involved in channeling arms through the Middle East, often using Pakistan as a backdoor and many times leading to another group, the Afghan Mujaheddin.16 As the sale of arms investigation began to surface and gain press attention, an alarming second scandal emerged that the “profits from the Iranian deal had been diverted to the Contras.”17 These two incidences together became known as the Iran-Contra Scandal.

What resulted from the investigations was that the “members of the Reagan administration offered a variety of accounts for the Iran-Contra affair”.18 Lies, denials, finger pointing and scapegoating became the norm which lead to two possible conclusions about President Reagan; he was either guilty of breaking laws and lying to the American Congress and public, or guilty of leading an administration based on incompetence, lies, and corruption. Attempts to charge Reagan with any crimes or accountability proved a failure even after forty days of questioning, which historian Amiya Rao argues, resulted in “numerous contradictions” unsolved, and “no coherent and complete account that could be elicited.”19

As noted above, Congress banned the transfer of funds to the Contras in the Boland Amendment. Members of the Reagan administration knowingly and purposely ignored this amendment and found alternative ways to fund the Contras. One of the key actors being investigated was Lt Col North, he argued that “the Boland Amendment did not apply to the Presidents Staff.”20 This paper argues that this is entirely incorrect and that the Reagan administration committed an illegal offence. Since the administration knew it was illegal to fund the Contras directly, they used their reprogramming authority, which allowed them to move funds from one project to another without the approval of congress; this included transfers from private investors, foreign contributors, and in this case, the illegal sale of arms to Iran.21 Within the Boland Amendment, it states that no “entity involved in intelligence activities” is allowed to fund the Contras.22 Within the National Security Act it states that the CIA is established under the National Security Council.23 Louis Fisher argues that “How can a subordinate body (the CIA) be involved in intelligence activities but not the controlling agency (the NSC)?”24 Furthermore, in Executive Order No.12,333 it states that the National Security Council “shall act as the highest Executive Branch entity that provides review of, guidance for and direction to the conduct of all national foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and special activities [covert operations], and attendant policies and programs.”25 This was issued by President Reagan himself. Reagan signed a document that the NSC is the highest power in control of intelligence, Congress issued an Amendment that no intelligence entity is allowed to fund the Contras, the Reagan administration indirectly but knowingly funded the Contras behind the backs of Congress, and therefore the Reagan administration is guilty of breaking the law.

The sale of arms to Iran is proven and clear. The negotiation to trade the hostages has proven more difficult to vindicate. One major problem is that the Reagan administration knowingly and actively lied, told contradictory accounts, and openly admitted to keeping Congress in the dark. The President of the United States has either two possible roles in this scenario; he was either aware of, and approved of illegal actions, or he lead an administration which conducted itself with such corruption that a significant amount of high ranking officials were committing illegal and undemocratic actions under his leadership that his presidency was an utter failure in discipline and management. Poindexter “disclosed that President Reagan himself approved of the bargaining offer to get the hostages back.”26 Schultz later denied the Presidents knowledge of the hostages.27 North, when asked if he knew of any documents that suggest the President approved any funds, denied it entirely, which later proved to be false.28 Col North claimed he had full approvals with everything he did, McFarlane contradicted this claiming “I had not approved all of Col North’s actions.”28 It became clear that North had become the scapegoat for the President. Rao argues that North “gave a complete cover up to the President.”29 When being trialed North said, “if this whole thing came down to creating political controversy or embarrassment I would be the scapegoat”, asked for whom his reply was, “for whoever necessary, for the administration, for the president, for whoever high up the chain that they needed to say that’s the guy who did it.”30 Poindexter alarmingly stated, “my objective all along was to with-hold from Congress exactly what the NSC staff was doing.”31 In fact, the entire reason this scandal was under the ring of covert operations wasn’t for the secrecy or protection of government agents or national security, but was done specifically to hide from and lie to Congress. Kornbluh and Parry argue in their assessment of the lies and misinformation prevalent in the Iran-Contra scandal that “without accurate, honest information, citizens cannot participate meaningfully in democracy and cannot hold government officials accountable.”32 This is what occurred in the Iran-Contra scandal, poor information and lies lead to a lack of accountability.

The level of contradictions, lies, and misinformation within the Reagan administration is prevalent and evident. When the committee investigating the scandal asked North to show the documents which “indicate that the President had approved an Iran arms shipment in November 19, 1985”, North shockingly said that he “tore it up” and “threw it in his burnbag.”33 He states he did this because “it is the responsibility of the president’s men to protect their leader.”34 The evidence heavily suggests a cover up of Reagan’s actions and awareness of the details of the program; how much he knew, or what specifically he approved of has been the center of debate for academics since the scandal emerged. What this paper demonstrates is a strong suggestion and suspicion within the Reagan administration of a cover up. At best, Reagan, if not a criminal himself, created an atmosphere and administration which was based directly and fundamentally on illegal, undemocratic and unaccountable principles.

One of the leaders in aiming accountability towards President Reagan is Independent Counsel Walsh. In his 1997 memoir “Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover Up” he dives into the illegal actions of the Reagan administration. While difficult to prove due to the suspicious cover up like behavior of the administration and the destruction of documents, evidence still suggests that Reagan approved the sale of arms for cash and for the release of hostages.36 Reagan’s administration made a mockery of the firm United States principle of not negotiating with terrorists and even Reagan’s own repeated statement “no concessions to terrortists.”37 Walsh, among many others, argue that Reagan’s behavior, and his administration which ran on illegality and misinformation, were heavy grounds for impeachment; he argues that “Reagan was within range of impeachment.”38 Gray Cavender, Nancy Jurik, and Albert Cohen also agree with this; in their work on the scandal they write “the administration violated its own policy against negotiating with terrorists, and the President failed to notify Congress of the arms sale, as the law requires.”39 Reagan, and his administration, violated the Arms Export Control Act, the National Security Act, the Boland Agreement, and lied to both Congress and the public, so the question arises; should he have been impeached?40 Impeachment in the United States is a rare and serious matter. By impeachment this paper uses the definition of “a political trial that is authorized by a legislative body and is conducted by a separate political institution” in order to remove a leader such as a President from their position.41 The impeachment process is imbedded in the US Constitution, it is a formal charge, only the House of Representatives has the power to initiate an impeachment and the Senate is the one that conducts the process.42 While no formal impeachment charge was ever laid out in the House of Representatives against Reagan, the idea sprang into debate frequently and launched subsequent investigations, including by Counsel Walsh.43 Furthermore, the House and the Senate both conducted their own hearings in 1987 and further searched for a conclusive answer in the scandal.44 These were different than the previous official investigation by the administration. Following the media coverage of the scandal, Reagan established a group called “The Tower Commission” to investigate the allegations, however it had only a few months to complete the work and also “had virtually no legal powers to investigate, it could not subpoena documents, compel testimony or grant immunity.”45 Remarkably these new investigations uncovered much new evidence and lead to the trial of many members of the administration, however the “smoking gun” to convict the President was never found.
This paper argues that the President indeed should have been impeached from his position. As stated previously, this scandal has essentially two possible conclusions: either the President knowingly broke laws repeatedly, or he lead an administration so poorly that it bred an atmosphere where many senior officials viewed breaking the law as an acceptable and encouraged practice. Rao agrees with this point, even if Reagan didn’t directly approve the actions, the investigations showed an “administration in complete disarray” she continues, there was “infighting, backstabbing, grabbing of power, whispering campaign against inconvenient colleagues, a kind of guerrilla war.”46 The administration broke laws, destroyed evidence, hurt their global credibility, worked with terrorists, and lied to the American Congress and people. The policies implemented in the Persian Gulf during the mid-1980s and in Nicaragua were against Reagan’s “publically stated and understood intent.”47 Article Two Section 3 of the US Constitution includes that one of the Presidents few constitutionally written duties is to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”48 Ronald Reagan failed in this duty. He failed to run an honorable administration and his leadership resulted in a political and international crisis. Kornbluh further articulates this thinking that “the Reagan administration created or at least tolerated an environment where disdain for the law and pervasive dishonesty became routine bureaucratic procedure.”49 If many scholars and investigators put blame on Reagan, then why was he not impeached? A few key reasons circulate in the academic literature: first that no official “smoking gun” was ever found to formally charge Reagan fully, secondly that the media and many politicians supported Reagan, and thirdly that the public simply didn’t care very much. Hinojosa and Perez-Linan write that, “In the absence of a way to directly tie the President to the actions, blame fell on other members of the executive branch, many of whom were prosecuted (and some convicted) for their crimes.”50 While it was believed he broke the law, and testimonies would often account for it, no definitive final charge was ever made against the President. Secondly, the media and others heavily supported the President. The loyalty to the President was clear with officials such as North explicitly stating that they would take the blame and protect the President.51 Furthermore news agencies such as the New York Times and CBS had very few stories which were critical of the President; of the many that were published regarding the scandal few framed the conversation in ways to make the President appear guilty.52 Senator Nunn told the press, “we must work to help the President restore credibility”53 and Correspondent Phil Jones noticed that the scandal “prompted a curious sort of congressional rally around the Presidency.”54 Arguably the most important reason Reagan wasn’t impeached, is simply that the public did not care very much. The scandal led to the largest ever single month drop in presidential approval rating.54 Shortly after this however, the public quickly got over it and stopped caring entirely. The majority of the public felt the President had lied about the scandal and also that Reagan knew of events or approved them much earlier than he had admitted to, however “barely a third ever thought the President should consider resigning.”55 Hinojosa and Perez-Linan explain that “the allegations appeared to the public to be technically correct but politically irrelevant, and the President, even without a congressional majority, was safe.”56 Essentially what occurred is that the public, while believing the President had lied about the Iran-Contra incident, felt he shouldn’t have been impeached and felt the incident wasn’t significant enough to spend too much time on. Quickly the public moved on from the issue, and the President escaped accountability. Curiously, while this paper argues that the President should have been impeached for his actions and poor leadership, the American public were against this notion. In one respect, if the American public supports the President, impeachment becomes difficult because it’s the House of Representatives and the Senate who have to conduct the impeachment, if the public supports the President it would seem a risk to counter the general consensus, even if clear laws were broken.

Before this paper concludes it’s also important to look at the broader implications and revelations of this scandal. What this scandal demonstrated, besides the clear problems with the Reagan administration, was also a potential problem with the policies of US covert operations, as well as a major tension between the congressional and executive branches. The central theme of the scandal, is that the executive officials lied to, and avoided accountability from, the legislative congressional branch. Kornbluh states that “the constitution demands executive branch accountability to the legislative branch.”58 This scandal demonstrates a lack of accountability, the executive branch acted above the law and above the constitution, it conducted covert operations which were in direct conflict with the principles and laws of the United States. This incident according to John Canham-Clyne, challenged the idea that institutional secrecy and executive covert operations can operate or belong within a democratic system.59 He argues that the “numerous layers of deniability and officially sanctioned lying often make it difficult for U.S. citizens to apprehend even the barest outline of policies created in their name.”60 This made it difficult for congress or the public to truly understand what happened or who was accountable. Not only is there the problem of lawlessness and lack of accountability, this scandal also demonstrated the level of rampant corruption in the White House administrative culture. Morton Halperin echoes Canham-Clyne’s thinking that Reagan “fostered a policy and environment where he was not accountable to Congress or the American people.”61 Essentially the National Security Council operated under a level of corruption where the checks in place to control executive power on foreign affairs were eroded. Halperin argues an alternative to outright lying to congress for covert operations can be as simple as establishing a parallel structure to in order to get consultation and approval from congressional advisors.62 Not only did the Iran-Contra scandal lead to debates over the legitimacy and guilt of the President Reagan, but further it ruptured the trust of the entire National Security Council.

In conclusion, the Iran-Contra scandal was a covert operation carried out by the National Security Agency without the approval of Congress. Its purpose was to illegally sell arms to Iran, in return receive the release of seven American hostages captured by Hezbollah, furthermore the funds from the arms sales would then be directed to illegally fund the Contras in Nicaragua. Multiple members of the administration were charged (most were pardoned later), while a “smoking gun” to convict the President was never found, the evidence suggests that Reagan had some involvement and approval. Accordingly, even if the President had zero knowledge, the atmosphere and environment under his leadership was evidently based on lawlessness, deception and anti-democratic principles. Reagan failed as a President to uphold the rule of law and his executive administration lied to the public and to Congress. The scandal created a tension between the congressional and executive branches, devaluing the Presidency, the National Security Council, and the principles of liberty and law which they swore to uphold and protect. For leading an administration which broke laws, lied, and attempted to cover up a foreign affairs scandal, President Reagan should have been impeached.

End Notes

  1. Marshall, Jordan et al. The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era. Black Rose Books ltd: 1987
  2. Ibid
  3. Ibid
  4. Marshall, Jordan et al. The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era. pp. 11
  5. “The 1984 Boland Agreement.” Further Continuning Appropriations Resolutoon For Fiscal Year 1985 (P.L.98-473). Aug. 23, 1985. National Security Council. Washington DC.
  6. Ibid
  7. Block, Alan A. The Organized Crime Community: Essays in the Honor of Alan A. Block. Ed. Frank Bovenkerk and Michael Levi. New York: Springer, 2007
  8. Hinojosa, Victor J. & Perez-Linan, Anibal S. “Presidential Survival and the Impeachment Process: The United States and Colombia.” Political Science Quarterly, 121, No. 4 (Winter, 2006/2007), pp 669
  9. Cavender, Gray et al. “The Baffling Case of the Smoking Gun: The Social Ecology of Political Accounts in the Iran-Contra Affair.” Social Problems, Vol. 40, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp 152
  10. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 22, No. 38 (Sep. 19, 1987), pp. 1594
  11. Woody & Klien. All the Presidents’ Spokesmen: Spinning the News-Press Secretaries from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to George W. Bush. Westport: Greenworld Publishing Group, 2008. pp 144
  12. Woody & Klien. All the Presidents’ Spokesmen: Spinning the News-Press Secretaries from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to George W. Bush. pp.149
  13. Cavender, Gray et al. “The Baffling Case of the Smoking Gun: The Social Ecology of Political Accounts in the Iran-Contra Affair.” pp.155
  14. Ibid
  15. Ibid
  16. Canham-Clyne, John. “Business as Usual: Iran-Contra and the National Security State.” World Policy Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall – Winter, 1992), pp. 627
  17. Cavender, Gray et al. “The Baffling Case of the Smoking Gun: The Social Ecology of Political Accounts in the Iran-Contra Affair.” pp.155
  18. Ibid
  19. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” pp. 1594
  20. Ibid
  21. Sharpe, Kenneth E. “The Real Cause of Irangate.” Foreign Policy, No. 68 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 33
  22. “The 1984 Boland Agreement.”
  23. Fisher, Louis. “How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 83, No. 4, The United States Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign Affairs (Oct., 1989), pp. 760
  24. Ibid
  25. Ibid
  26. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” pp. 1594
  27. Ibid
  28. Ibid
  29. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” pp. 1595
  30. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” pp. 1594
  31. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” pp. 1595
  32. Kornbluh, Peter. “The Iran-Contra Scandal: A Postmortem.” World Policy Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter, 1987/1988), pp. 146
  33. Parry, Robert. & Kornbluh, Peter. “Iran-Contras Untold Story.” Foreign Policy, 72 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 29
  34. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” pp. 1595
  35. Ibid
  36. Block, Alan A. The Organized Crime Community: Essays in the Honor of Alan A. Block. pp.4
  37. Ibid
  38. Ibid
  39. Cavender, Gray et al. “The Baffling Case of the Smoking Gun: The Social Ecology of Political Accounts in the Iran-Contra Affair.” pp.152
  40. Block, Alan A. The Organized Crime Community: Essays in the Honor of Alan A. Block. pp.4
  41. Hinojosa, Victor J. & Perez-Linan, Anibal S. “Presidential Survival and the Impeachment Process: The United States and Colombia.” pp. 665
  42. Ibid
  43. Hinojosa, Victor J. & Perez-Linan, Anibal S. “Presidential Survival and the Impeachment Process: The United States and Colombia.” pp. 669
  44. Ibid
  45. Block, Alan A. The Organized Crime Community: Essays in the Honor of Alan A. Block. pp.2
  46. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” pp. 1596
  47. Canham-Clyne, John. “Business as Usual: Iran-Contra and the National Security State.” pp. 628
  48. S. Constitution. art. 2. sec. 3. cl. 1.
  49. Kornbluh, Peter. “The Iran-Contra Scandal: A Postmortem.” pp. 129
  50. Hinojosa, Victor J. & Perez-Linan, Anibal S. “Presidential Survival and the Impeachment Process: The United States and Colombia.” pp. 670
  51. Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” pp. 1594
  52. Brody, Richard A. & Shapiro, Catherine R. “Policy Failure and Public Support: The Iran-Contra Affair and Public Assessment of President Reagan.” Political Behavior, 11, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 363
  53. Ibid
  54. Ibid
  55. Hinojosa, Victor J. & Perez-Linan, Anibal S. “Presidential Survival and the Impeachment Process: The United States and Colombia.” pp. 670
  56. Ibid
  57. Ibid
  58. Kornbluh, Peter. “The Iran-Contra Scandal: A Postmortem.” pp. 158
  59. Canham-Clyne, John. “Business as Usual: Iran-Contra and the National Security State.” pp. 617
  60. Ibid
  61. Halperin, Morton H. “Lawful Wars.” Foreign Policy, 72 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 176-177
  62. Halperin, Morton H. “Lawful Wars.” Foreign Policy, 72 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 178

Work Cited

Brody, Richard A. & Shapiro, Catherine R. “Policy Failure and Public Support: The Iran-Contra Affair and Public Assessment of President Reagan.” Political Behavior, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 353-369

Block, Alan A. The Organized Crime Community: Essays in the Honor of Alan A. Block. Ed. Frank Bovenkerk and Michael Levi. New York: Springer, 2007.

Canham-Clyne, John. “Business as Usual: Iran-Contra and the National Security State.” World Policy Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall – Winter, 1992), pp. 617-637

Cavender, Gray et al. “The Baffling Case of the Smoking Gun: The Social Ecology of Political Accounts in the Iran-Contra Affair.” Social Problems, Vol. 40, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 152-166

Fisher, Louis. “How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 83, No. 4, The United States Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign Affairs (Oct., 1989), pp. 758-766

Halperin, Morton H. “Lawful Wars.” Foreign Policy, No. 72 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 173-195

Hinojosa, Victor J. & Perez-Linan, Anibal S. “Presidential Survival and the Impeachment Process: The United States and Colombia.” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 121, No. 4 (Winter, 2006/2007), pp. 653-675

Koh, Harold Hongju. “Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair.” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 97, No. 7 (Jun., 1988), pp. 1255-13

Kornbluh, Peter. “The Iran-Contra Scandal: A Postmortem.” World Policy Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter, 1987/1988), pp. 129-150

Marshall, Jordan et al. The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era. Black Rose Books ltd: 1987

Parry, Robert. & Kornbluh, Peter. “Iran-Contras Untold Story.” Foreign Policy, No. 72 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 3-30
Rao, Amiya. “All the President’s Men.” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 22, No. 38 (Sep. 19, 1987), pp. 1594-1596.

Sharpe, Kenneth E. “The Real Cause of Irangate.” Foreign Policy, No. 68 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 19-41

“The 1984 Boland Agreement.” Further Continuning Appropriations Resolutoon For Fiscal Year 1985 (P.L.98-473). Aug. 23, 1985. National Security Council. Washington DC. Uploaded By: Brown University. Web. https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/documents/d-nic-21.pdf

U.S. Constitution. art. 2. sec. 3. cl. 1.

Woody & Klien. All the Presidents’ Spokesmen: Spinning the News-Press Secretaries from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to George W. Bush. Westport: Greenworld Publishing Group, 2008.

 

Written By: Daniel Govedar (March 2015)

 

 

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